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ABSTRACT
In this study, we first review contact tracing methods used during the COVID-19
pandemic and provide an analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of different data collection and
privacy protection methods. Our findings provide the benefits and drawbacks of using GPS
versus Bluetooth for contact tracing, as well as the different data collection and storage methods
and their effectiveness in protecting user privacy. We then analyze Twitter data to understand
individual mobility behavior and sentiment by using a Natural Language Processing tool on text
content of user tweets and Tweet coordinate data. Social media’s ability to provide data on
location and user sentiment through tweet text content makes it a complementary data source for
understanding individual mobility behavior and attitudes during a disaster such as a global
pandemic. Analyzing mobility behavior and sentiment during COVID-19 lockdown protocols is
crucial in understanding the effectiveness of these pandemic procedures and improving them for
future pandemics. We also assess the viability of using Google Maps GPS data for contact
tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic. To do this, we generated activity diaries from a
participant’s Google Maps Location data and GPS ground truth data and compared visited
locations and stay durations obtained for each location recording method. This study provides a
thorough analysis of the use of passively collected location data to investigate the effect of
pandemic restrictions and track individuals’ interactions and visited locations for contact tracing
purposes. It is our intention to aid health authorities, government officials, and other policy
makers in developing innovative responses to these threats so that the most negative effects of
future pandemics may be avoided.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic caused unprecedented levels of death and economic hardship
around the world. With the outbreak of the pandemic followed mitigation measures including
lockdown orders, quarantine measures, mask mandates, contact tracing, and widespread testing
[17]. Governments’ responses to the threat of the pandemic varied in effectiveness. Limiting
mobility, implementing quarantine guidelines, and utilizing contact tracing procedures were the
most effective tools in slowing the spread of the pandemic. Tracking the contacts and visited
locations of infected individuals was vital in identifying possibly infected individuals, and
quarantines and lockdowns were able to limit the pandemic’s spread. However, with the
implementation of these protocols came unforeseen consequences. Taking advantage of
passively collected location data in the fight against an infectious disease can significantly
improve these processes and further limit a pandemic’s negative impacts on communities around
the world.
Passively collected location data can be a useful tool for limiting the spread of a
pandemic because of its ease of use and ability to collect important data on individual mobility
patterns without inconveniencing the user. The widespread adoption of devices such as smart
phones and smart watches that can passively store location data has enabled this data to be
collected on a large scale. The pervasiveness of social media websites such as Twitter and
Facebook have also increased the availability of this type of data. However, there are concerns
associated with privacy when dealing with this kind of sensitive data. The method of collecting
this data and sharing exposure notifications is a sensitive process that we will explore more indepth in this paper.
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This study presents a review of the existing and theoretical digital contact tracing
methods used during the COVID-19 pandemic. The types of user data collected and methods of
protecting user privacy are reviewed and the effectiveness of these methods are discussed. Their
effectiveness can be determined by their accuracy, their ability to protect user privacy, and the
rate of adoption by their corresponding target users. How much privacy factors into user trust
and adoption is also an important factor to consider in analyzing these contact tracing
applications. We also assess the viability of using Google Maps Location History data for
contact tracing purposes. To accomplish this, we use a DBSCAN clustering algorithm to
generate an activity diary and compare visited locations and stay durations with ground truth
GPS data.
To understand the shift in individual mobility behavior before and during COVID-19
lockdown orders were put in place, we analyze user behavior based on their Tweet coordinate
location and tweet text content. We utilize radius of gyration to determine degree of movement
around the user’s home location. We also employ a Natural Language Processing tool to
understand users’ sentiment and attitudes before and during lockdown. This study should provide
an extensive look at the potential of passively collected data in developing innovative and
effective solutions for limiting the spread of a deadly pandemic.
This study has made several contributions to the development and improvement of
processes to limit the effects of a pandemic. We provide a comprehensive summary of different
digital contact tracing methods so that health authorities and policy makers may identify what
works best for their communities. We also develop a framework for using GPS and Google Maps
Location History data to model individual mobility and track infections of a transmissible
disease. This study also contributes some methods to understand the effects of a pandemic using
2

social media data. By providing some new sources of passively collected location data to analyze
mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic, we hope to improve understanding of the negative
effects of the pandemic as well as quarantine and lockdown protocols, and aid policy makers in
improving these procedures in the event of future pandemic or endemic diseases.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF CONTACT TRACING
METHODS
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health emergency that continues to affect
the lives and wellbeing of people around the world. Many of the steps used to mitigate the spread
of the infectious respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus included lockdown and
social distancing measures, widespread testing, mask mandates, and contact tracing. Contact
Tracing refers to the process of identifying close contacts, notifying contacts of exposure,
addressing questions and concerns, referring for SARS-CoV-2 testing, encouraging selfquarantine, monitoring of symptoms, and assessing the need for additional supportive services
during the quarantine period [1]. Contact tracing infected individuals, and individuals they have
encountered, is an important tool in the fight against infectious diseases. Many governments
have implemented their own tools and methods. Many states in the United States, for example,
rely on contacting infected or potentially infected individuals, or requesting assistance from their
recent contacts to trace other possibly infected individuals. However, this system has proven to
be ineffective in many developed nations, largely due to the reluctance of individuals to provide
their own personal health information, underfunded healthcare systems, and a lack of contact
tracing professionals [2].
Digital contact tracing is an emerging method of collecting data of infected individuals,
while preserving user privacy. The most prominent implementation of this technology involves
using location-tracking technologies, mostly GPS and Bluetooth, available in most smartphones
to track individuals who tested positive for, were potentially exposed to, or exhibited symptoms
of COVID-19, often using an application installed on users’ smart phones. Most mobile
applications developed for digital contact tracing monitor and notify users of possible exposure
4

to a potentially infected individual so that they may self-isolate and acquire a test for the virus if
necessary.
Bluetooth contact tracing relies on collecting interaction tokens on users’ devices based
on devices they come into proximity with for a specified amount of time. Users are notified
when they have been at risk of exposure because a user they came into contact with has tested
positive. This method is generally considered to be adequate for protecting users’ privacy since it
does not store users’ personal information across devices, and only collects anonymized user
tokens. GPS contact tracing methods are less abundant and can often have privacy concerns
associated with them due to the need to collect users’ location information. There are some
drawbacks associated with these methods, including effectiveness and protection of user privacy.
The main concern associated with these digital contact tracing methods is the collection and
storage of large amounts of personal data. The adoption of these applications depends on user
trust, so they must be able to adequately protect user health data. The three main areas of concern
when it comes to protecting user privacy include privacy from snoopers, privacy from contacts,
and privacy from the authorities [3]. The two approaches for data collection and privacy
protection typically used are centralized and decentralized approaches. A centralized approach
collects user data on a centralized server usually controlled by the central government or health
agency, and a decentralized approach collects data on users’ devices without the use of a central
server. The decentralized approach is generally considered to be more secure with users’ privacy
since it doesn’t require collection of personal health information that could become vulnerable to
attack. However, there are methods of encryption and protection that can allow centralized
approaches to anonymize and protect user data according to all three facets of user privacy.
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This study can be used to demonstrate the most effective methods of digital contact
tracing to improve its real-world application and adoption. Although multiple studies exist
analyzing existing digital contact tracing technologies, there is a significant gap in the research in
comparing these methods and providing benefits and drawbacks of each. This type of analysis
will allow health authorities and governments around the world to make informed decisions on
which type of digital contact tracing technology will be most effective for their citizens.

User Data Methodology
This section will introduce the different methods and processes used to collect users’
location data. The two main types of user data utilized through digital contact tracing are
Bluetooth interaction data and GPS data. Bluetooth contact tracing methods saw widespread
adoption during the COVID-19 pandemic thanks to a joint API developed by Google and Apple
for using the Bluetooth technology available on iPhones and Android phones for contact tracing.
The Exposure Notification API allows developers to determine what constitutes sufficient
contact time and distance for a reasonable risk of infection and implement that functionality into
a mobile phone application. Every time two users of the application come into contact, their
devices generate a Bluetooth interaction token that is stored on each users’ device. Interaction
tokens are generated and stored exclusively on users’ devices, and each token is a randomly
generated, anonymized number [13].
Once a user tests positive, they decide whether to provide their diagnosis key to the
server. Once provided, the anonymous key is sent to the server so that devices that hold that
user’s Bluetooth interaction tokens can be notified of their risk of infection [13]. Governments
and health authorities were able to use the API to develop applications that aided in the disease
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mitigation efforts. Some of the applications developed that used these technologies include
COVID Watch (Arizona), CA Notify (California), COVIDSafe (Australia), Immuni (Italy),
AlohaSafe (Hawaii), and the NHS COVID 19 App (United Kingdom). Another Bluetooth tracing
app that opted out of using the Apple-Google Exposure Notification API is Singapore’s
TraceTogether app. Government officials wanted their contact-tracing system to have “more
detailed information and be able to more easily sort through users’ infection histories” [4]. The
API did not allow them to see information pertaining to “how, when, or by whom an individual
may have been exposed” [4].
Multiple countries have used mobile phone GPS data for contact tracing as well. South
Korea implemented a far-reaching method of tracking patients’ mobility including GPS mobile
phone tracking, credit card records, and surveillance video. Then the government provides the
public with information on areas of exposure via their central website or regional text messages
[6]. Several private developers have taken this data and used it to track the locations of infected
individuals and map out COVID-19 hotspots throughout the pandemic. Names of patients
remained confidential, however personal information such as sex, age, and visited locations were
published on the central website [6]. This has raised several privacy concerns in the nation due to
the public availability of the data. Israel is another country that used GPS location data to track
infected individuals through the app Hamagen.
Hamagen collects location information on the user’s phone then compares this
information with the location data of infected individuals gathered by Israel’s Ministry of Health.
This app stores each user’s location data on their mobile phone and does not share this
information between users or with the central health agency, but it does take advantage of
Israel’s surveillance measures which allow it to collect infected individuals’ personal health
7

information and location data. This app did not reach the critical number of users necessary for it
to be an effective method of contact tracing and has seen nearly a third of its users delete the app
[7]. Israel therefore continued to use its own primary method of contact tracing which took
advantage of the surveillance capabilities of its own intelligence agency to monitor citizens’
mobile phone records (including calls, texts, and locations) for contact tracing purposes. This
system allows the country’s central health agency to use this information to notify individuals
when they’ve been exposed and should get tested [7]. However, this approach has been criticized
as a significant violation of individuals’ privacy and was eventually prohibited by the Israeli
Supreme Court in 2021 as an infringement on civil liberties [8].
Taiwan was able to utilize the contact tracing platform they developed following the
Ebola epidemic in West Africa. This platform is called TRACE and it generates and manages
contacts of infected individuals, monitors health of contacts, and recommends quarantine for
close contacts [9]. Upon receiving a positive test result, patients needed to go through case
investigation to determine their movements and contacts. This information is then used to
generate a contacts list, which involves collecting contacts’ personal information. The Central
Epidemic Command Center (CECC) would then monitor the health of close contacts (contacts
defined as having contact with a patient within two meters for 15 min from two days before the
onset of symptoms until the date of isolation) via texts, manual updates, or home visits, and
would even use phone location to detect whether individuals under mandatory quarantine left
their designated location [7]. The following table provides a summary of existing contact tracing
apps.
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Table 2.1: Digital Contact Tracing Platforms

Name

Location

Mobile
Phone
Application
(Y/N)

Type of User
Data

Data Collection
Method

Population
Adoption
Rate

AlohaSafe

Hawaii,
USA

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

31%

CA Notify

California,
USA

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

10%

COVIDSafe

Australia

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

25%

COVID Watch

Arizona,
USA

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

Hamagen

Israel

Y

GPS

Decentralized

22%

Immuni

Italy

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

17%

NHS COVID 19

United
Kingdom

Y

Bluetooth

Decentralized

Rakning C-19

Iceland

Y

GPS

Decentralized
until positive
test result
confirmed by
user

38%

TousAntiCOVID France

Y

Bluetooth

Centralized

13%

TRACE

Taiwan

N

UserProvided
Contact
Information

Centralized

Trace Together

Singapore

Y

Bluetooth

Centralized

N/A

South
Korea

N

Mobile phone Centralized
GPS, credit
card records,
surveillance,
etc.

9

70%

Privacy Protection Methodology
This section will discuss the different methods used to protect user privacy after
collection and during tracing procedures. The apps developed using Apple and Google’s contact
tracing API utilize a decentralized approach to collecting user data. These Bluetooth applications
provide a decentralized form of storage for data in the form of anonymized tokens which are
effective in protecting users’ privacy. This approach greatly reduces the amount of personal
information shared between devices and with the central health authority. The infected individual
remains anonymous throughout the process, and other users receive a notification that they have
come into contact with an infected person.
Centralized approaches for collecting user data often have the potential to violate user
privacy, however, several studies have proposed a variety of encryption and anonymization
methods to aid in protecting user privacy. These methods can address the weaknesses of existing
contact tracing methods and suggest improved frameworks. One theoretical framework proposes
a centralized approach utilizing users’ GPS data that still adequately protects users’ privacy
(Reichert et al., 2020). Once a user tests positive for COVID-19, the platform initiates sessions
with other users to collect their location histories, and compares them to the infected user’s data
points to see if there was possible transmission based on a geographical and temporal component
(x,y,t), and notifies them whether they were at risk of infection without disclosing any of the
infected user’s information [58]. In order to accomplish this, they suggest the use of secure
multi-party computation (MPC), which involves allowing individual users to hold input keys to
collectively evaluate a function. Each user then only knows their own individual output and not
the inputs of others [58]. This method, along with the use of an oblivious random access memory
(ORAM) allows users’ data to remain private when they communicate with the central health
10

agency or authority. No data on past locations, test results, or personal information is revealed to
the health authority or other users.
This study (Cho et al., 2020) also proposes an improved privacy model for Singapore’s
TraceTogether app. The TraceTogether system uses anonymized tokens that are collected on
users’ devices once they are within close proximity to someone for a certain period of time.
Singapore collects these tokens on a central database along with users’ phone numbers and
personal information [3]. This makes the TraceTogether system vulnerable to attack and puts
users’ personal information at risk. To protect users’ privacy from the central government or
health agency, this study proposes a system using private messaging between users. Two users
who come into contact exchange a key which can decrypt messages sent between them. Then,
when one user wants to make their infection status known, they use a proxy server to send an
encrypted message to the other users’ mailbox that pertains to the key they exchanged with each
other. The mailboxes are controlled by the central government or health agency, but since they
do not have the key to decrypt the message, they do not collect any private user information.
Then the other user can receive the message from their mailbox, use the appropriate encryption
key, and learn whether they were at risk of exposure [3]. This is a method of centralized data
collection that protects users’ privacy against attackers and the central health authority.
These applications depend on a high rate of adoption to be effective at limiting the spread
of an infectious disease. It is estimated that 56% of the general population would have to adopt a
digital contact tracing app for it to be effective, which is up to 80% of the population of
smartphone users [10]. However, if digital contact tracing is utilized in conjunction with other
mitigation strategies such as lockdown or social distancing orders it may require a much lower
rate of adoption. One study (Moreno Lopez et al., 2021) found that along with household
11

isolation, digital contact tracing apps could be used to help keep spread of a pandemic to a
moderate R level of 1.7 (Basic reproduction number that represents the transmissibility of an
infectious disease [11]) if 32% of the population downloaded the app [12]. Several countries saw
suboptimal download rates of their contact tracing applications. France’s app had an adoption
rate of 13% of the total population, Italy had a rate of 17%, Australia had 25%, and Iceland had
38% [12]. However, one of the most successful contact tracing applications was Singapore’s
TraceTogether system. Trace Together had a 70% rate of adoption by the Singaporean
population as of December 2020 [14]. This is likely due to the Singaporean government making
70% adoption of the TraceTogether system a requirement for it to enter stage three of reopening,
and the deployment of a TraceTogether token that can be used by individuals without a
smartphone. The token is a portable Bluetooth device that can communicate with devices and
generate user-specific tokens just like the smartphone app [14]. This incentive for citizens to use
the TraceTogether system, along with clear messaging about contact tracing, was a huge driver
in adoption of the TraceTogether system. The use of tokens that do not require a smartphone also
allows the government to target far more citizens, especially those in the older age brackets that
have the lowest percentage of smartphone usage yet the highest risk of complications due to
COVID-19 [12].
Concerns over privacy and trust of the government are the main concerns affecting
adoption rate of many of these digital contact tracing methods. In order to improve user adoption
of digital contact tracing applications, user privacy must be addressed and protected. Developers
must ensure user data is protected and only used for contact tracing and health purposes, that
participation in data collection is voluntary, and that source code is available to the public [15].
Accuracy is also a concern with digital contact tracing methods. Inaccuracies can occur when
12

tracking GPS location and Bluetooth interaction concerning things like elevation differences or
users detecting each other via Bluetooth despite being in separate rooms. Improvements must be
made to the security and effectiveness of Bluetooth technology for contact tracing purposes [15].
These steps to address and ensure privacy can increase citizens’ trust and therefore increase
adoption rates. Increased privacy and transparency of governments and health agencies can
address a significant amount of hesitancy users may have, but their feasibility and accuracy of
these methods must be addressed to make the applications viable.
Conclusion
Digital contact tracing methods are one of the most important tools in mitigating the
spread of a pandemic due to the widespread use of mobile phones, and the ability to store data on
users’ phones as opposed to a central server to protect their privacy. Decentralized and
centralized approaches to storing user data have been used for these digital contact tracing
methods. Decentralized approaches have been more popular due to the more secure practice of
storing data on users’ devices rather than on a central server that could be vulnerable to a data
hack or other malicious purposes. A large percentage of the population must download the
contact tracing app for the app to make a difference in mitigating the spread of a disease, so it is
important that users can trust that their privacy will be protected when using the application.
Normal contact tracing methods rely on individuals being able to recall former contacts and
locations visited, and on individuals being willing to share private health information such as
positive test results.
Other contact tracing methods, such as those used by the Israeli and South Korean
governments, have raised considerable public criticism due to their relatively invasive nature.
The ideal contact tracing method will vary from country to country and will depend on the
13

willingness of citizens to participate in the tracing effort. The methods used in South Korea and
Taiwan become less effective as case numbers begin to increase due to how labor-intensive they
are. Taiwan and South Korea were both highly effective in reducing cases early thanks to their
thorough mitigation measures, but if cases began to spiral out of control, their contact tracing
methods could have become far less effective. Therefore, digital contact tracing methods using
Bluetooth or GPS technology are less labor-intensive but effective methods of tracking infected
individuals and effectively mitigating the spread of an infectious disease.
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CHAPTER THREE: UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY BEHAVIOR
USING TWITTER DATA
Introduction
Lockdown protocols and social distancing measures were an important tool in the fight
against the COVID-19 pandemic. How citizens responded to and obeyed these measures varied
significantly from country to country. Lockdown measures, an important method of isolating and
preventing the spread of infection, were difficult to enforce and were often disobeyed.
Understanding how individuals behaved during these months of lockdowns is important for
improving these procedures so that they can effectively limit mobility and spread of the virus
while still convincing much of the population to remain indoors and isolated. The degree of
reduced mobility at the onset of the pandemic varied significantly between countries. Even
within the United States, different regions of the country showed varying reductions in individual
movement [18]. These differences could be a result of several things, including differing case
numbers, policy makers’ responses, a region’s demographics, and local perception of the threat
of the virus. How individuals were influenced by these factors is important for understanding
what makes people disregard mandatory quarantine and social distancing measures.
Social media platforms can provide individual movement data that can be used to analyze
and model individuals’ adherence to lockdown orders. Social media apps such as Twitter and
Facebook collect large amounts of important location and behavioral data that can be used to
model users’ behavior during lockdown periods. The analysis of tweet text content and
geotagged tweet data has been used to model the effects of hurricanes and other natural disasters
[19-23]; and due to the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, these same metrics can
provide insights into individual behavior. Social media can be used to measure the amount that
general mobility was limited during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how individuals behaved
15

based on their demographics and social media posts. These differences in demographics are
especially important in analyzing the results of the pandemic since COVID-19 affected minority
and older communities disproportionately more than any other demographic [24, 25]. This
information can help governments and policy makers to better understand the behavior of their
citizens and adapt their policies to what will be most effective for their citizens. User tweet
sentiment and attitude is also an important aspect when considering the effects of a pandemic.
Factors such as political affiliation, social context, trust in science, and emotion can all influence
an individual’s feelings about a pandemic [26, 27]. Tweet sentiment analysis can then be used to
capture individuals’ sentiment and attitudes towards the COVID-19 pandemic [28, 29].
Previous studies have analyzed aggregated Twitter user data to understand mobility
behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic [19], but no study has been conducted for analyzing
individual-level behavior. Our objective is to demonstrate that users’ mobility can be analyzed at
an individual level in a particular region, as opposed to aggregating the tweets of users across a
region and reporting the results at the level of said region. Therefore, we limited our study to
Twitter users within the state of Florida. We collected user-specific Twitter data from a set of
Florida-based Twitter users and analyzed their movement before and after lockdown periods, as
well as each user’s sentiment about the lockdown period based on their tweet sentiment analysis.
We then determined how user sentiment during the lockdown period correlates to users’ change
in mobility behavior.
Literature Review
Multiple studies have utilized Twitter data for human mobility analysis. However, there
are some difficulties associated with using the platform for this purpose. These include a
sampling bias due to Twitter users tending to misrepresent the demographics of the general
16

population since it tends to appeal to a younger crowd, and the varying preferences of where and
when Twitter users send tweets [30, 31]. Results from analyzing individual users’ mobility tend
to depend on these factors more so than large-scale population-level mobility [30]. Geotagged
tweets have been used to analyze human mobility during hurricane evacuation [23, 31, 32]. The
precise nature of when hurricane evacuation orders are issued and when a landfall occurs provide
a clear picture of when users evacuated, and where their homes and evacuation destinations were
located. This principle can also apply to lockdowns that occurred as a result of COVID-19 which
took effect on a certain date, were determined by a central authority, and were clearly
communicated to citizens across a large region of a state or country. Geotagged tweet data can
then be analyzed to show reduced mobility after lockdown orders were put in place for users
within certain regions. Huang et al. [19] determined the degree of reduced mobility in different
regions during the COVID-19 pandemic by aggregating the distance traveled by Twitter users in
different regions around the globe.
Analysis of the textual content of tweets from users impacted by a natural disaster can
also provide insights into the magnitude and effects of that disaster. User tweets have been used
to understand the effects of a natural disaster [19-23] and in understanding user sentiment and
attitudes during these disaster periods [28, 29, 33]. Tweet sentiment is an important tool for
understanding real-time response to disaster events, including pandemics and pandemic
protocols. Social media users can often provide early reactions to disaster events due to their
ability to send a tweet from anywhere, and the ease with which information spreads on these
platforms [34, 35]. Pandemics can benefit from this type of sentiment analysis due to the fastspreading and devastating nature of a disease like COVID-19.
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Demographics of social media users are a concern when using social media data for
sentiment and individual mobility analysis because certain older or less tech-literate portions of
the population may not have access to these applications [30, 31]. Analysis of user demographics
is important for understanding that while social media can provide a representation of the
movement and magnitude of a natural disaster, that it doesn’t provide a full picture of which
portions of the population were most negatively affected by that disaster. The “digital divide”
between the elderly and younger populations is an important factor to consider when using
modern technology such as smartphones and social media to model the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic [36, 37]. Existing studies have analyzed the demographics of Twitter users by using
data on user profiles such as name, location, language, profile picture, and followers [37-39].
Results from Mislove et al. [37] indicated that Twitter users tend to be a higher percentage male
and misrepresent racial groups throughout the United States. Users also tended to be from more
densely populated urban areas. These misrepresentations of users’ demographics must be
considered when modeling mobility patterns using social media data.
Data Description
We collected Twitter data on specific users from a set of Florida-based Twitter users
using the Twitter “Tweepy” API. Users were selected from a dataset of FL-based Twitter users,
and we determined that users were from Florida by using the location description in their profile
and the coordinates of their home location. Users’ inclusion in the study was determined by the
availability of their tweet coordinates and their number of tweets during the COVID-19
lockdown period. Users having at least 20 geotagged tweets during the pre-lockdown and
lockdown periods were selected for analysis. Overall, we collected data from 314 users for our
analysis. Users’ coordinates, tweet text content, tweet timestamp, and profile information such as
18

username, profile description, and home location were collected to obtain their location, mobility
behavior, and tweet sentiments. To compare users’ behavior and movement from before the
lockdown period to behavior during the lockdown period, we specified user tweets collected
from December 2019 to February 2020 as “pre-lockdown” and tweets collected from March
2020 to June 2020 as “during lockdown.” These dates are consistent with Florida’s statewide
lockdown orders which began in mid to late March and began to loosen in June with the
initiation of phase two of reopening in June 2020. This phase involved the reopening of theme
parks, restaurants, bars, gyms, museums, and libraries at limited capacity [40]. We have analyzed
user locations and tweet text content through the methods discussed in the following sections.
Mobility Behavior Methodology
Each user’s mobility was calculated using the concept of radius of gyration which is
defined as a measurement of an individual’s degree of movement around a central location [30].
For this study, each user’s central location is determined to be their home location since this is
where people are expected to spend most of their time during COVID-19 lockdowns. The degree
of movement is therefore calculated as a function of the frequency and distance of trips they took
away from their home location. Then, users’ radii of gyration were calculated for the periods
before and during the lockdown orders to determine if their degree of movement changed
between the two periods. The radius of gyration is determined by the following equation:
1

𝑟𝑔 = √𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1|𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝′|2

(1)

where 𝑝𝑖 is location 𝑖, 𝑝′ is the central location, and 𝑛 is the number of locations. This type of
mobility metric is useful in determining movement from coordinates due to the ease of
determining users’ home locations using Tweet coordinates. We expect that using this
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calculation will reveal an overall reduced degree of movement around users’ home locations
during lockdown periods due to strict quarantining and social distancing measures put in place
during this period. To determine home location, we collected each user’s most tweeted from
location (within a 50 m radius) from 10:00 pm to 7:00 am. Tweets with coordinates within 50
meters of each other are assumed to be the same location. Users’ home locations are determined
using the Haversine equation:
𝑑 = 2𝑟 arcsin (√𝑠𝑖𝑛2 (

𝜑2 −𝜑1
2

) + 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑1 )𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑2 )𝑠𝑖𝑛2 (

𝜆2 −𝜆1
2

)) (2)

which provides the distance in meters between two points on a sphere represented by twodimensional coordinates. The symbols 𝜑 and 𝜆 represent each set of coordinates (converted from
degrees to radians) and r is the radius of the earth. This equation is used to determine which
tweet locations are close enough to be classified as one location for the purposes of calculating
the home location. Figure 3.1 is a visualization of users’ home locations determined using the
process described above. Sampled users are distributed across the state of Florida.
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Figure 3.1: User Home Locations

Tweet Sentiment Methodology
User tweet sentiment is determined using the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) Python
library used for Natural Language Processing tasks [41]. We utilized the library’s pretrained
sentiment analyzer Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner (VADER). Sentiment
analysis is a field of natural language processing that analyzes emotion, point of view, and
attitude by analyzing the subjective nature of text and word choice [41]. The sentiment analyzer
provides string inputs with a positive, neutral, negative, and compound sentiment score based on
the words used. VADER is a “Valence-based” lexicon which means that it can determine the
intensity of positive or negative sentiment instead of simply providing a binary positive or
negative classification [41]. VADER is also best designed for short sentences commonly posted
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on social media sites like Twitter which makes it ideal for the purposes of this project. Two
examples of tweets from different users analyzed using the VADER lexicon are given below:

(a)

(b)
Figure 3.2: Tweet Sentiment Result Examples: (a) Net positive Tweet example (b) Net negative
Tweet example
The tweet represented in Figure 3.2a received a high positive score due to the use of
words like “love,” “great day,” and “enjoying” in a positive context. This tweet received a zero
in the negative score category due to the lack of negatively connotated vocabulary. The tweet in
Figure 3.2b on the other hand received a much higher negative score because of the use of words
like “mean,” “frustrated,” and “kill.” This tweet received a positive score of 0.186 as well for use
of the word “kindness.” The model still determined this was an overall negative tweet. In these
instances, the model was correct in its classification of the tweets’ overall sentiment. However,
despite its ability to correctly identify sentiment in shorter sentences found on social media, the
model does have some trouble classifying tweets that contain sarcasm, irony, or double
meanings. Despite this weakness in the model, we believe it is still overall very accurate in
determining users’ overall sentiment for the purposes of this paper. Our method for calculating
overall user tweet sentiment involves classifying tweets based on whether the positive or
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negative score is greater. If the two scores are equal for a tweet, then it is classified as a neutral
tweet. Then, we calculate the overall percentage of each user’s positive, negative, and neutral
tweets.
Results
Through this study we have determined the mobility behavior of individuals using
Twitter data, and conducted an analysis based on each users’ overall tweet sentiment. In order to
calculate each user’s change in radius of gyration between the two periods, we analyze the
results of each user as a proportion of their radius of gyration during lockdown to their radius of
gyration before lockdown. If users have a value below one, this means their movement was
reduced during lockdown, and if they have a value greater than one, their movement increased
during the lockdown period. The probability distribution and histogram of users’ reduction in
radius of gyration are provided in Figure 3.3.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3: Distribution of Proportion of Change in Radius of Gyration During Lockdown
Orders: (a) Probability density distribution of change in radius of gyration (b) Histogram of
users’ proportion of change in radius of gyration
Figure 3.3b shows that most users had reduced radius of gyration. Approximately 57% of
users had a reduced radius of gyration during the lockdown period when compared to prelockdown levels. The median value of the proportion of radius of gyration during lockdown to
radius of gyration before lockdown is 0.9409. This confirms our hypothesis that users’ degree of
movement would decrease during the lockdown months due to quarantine guidelines and travel
restrictions because of the pandemic. The median radius of gyration before lockdown of all users
is 74.30 km, and the median radius of gyration of all users during the lockdown period is 67.36
km. These results confirm our hypothesis that users would have an overall reduced radius of
gyration, and therefore reduced scale of travel during lockdown procedures.
Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b along with Table 1 provide density distributions of the results
of our tweet sentiment analysis. Users’ percentage of positive tweets increased during the
lockdown period, from 33.51% to 34.35% of total tweets, and the percentage of negative tweets
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decreased during the lockdown period, from 14.26% to 12.86% of total tweets. These differences
in tweet sentiment provided in Table 1 were found to be statistically significant after using
Pearson’s chi-square test. This finding does not support our hypothesis that users’ overall
sentiment and attitude on social media became more negative during lockdown. Given our
results, the shift to the lockdown period had a statistically significant effect on tweet sentiment
and caused tweets to become simultaneously more positive and less negative in general.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.4: Distribution of users’ percentage of positive and negative tweets before and during
lockdown procedures: (a) Users’ percentage of positive tweets (b) Users’ percentage of negative
tweets
Table 3.1: Average Percentages of Users’ Overall Tweet Sentiments
Pre-lockdown

During lockdown

Positive Tweets

33.51%

34.35%

Negative Tweets

14.26%

12.86%

Neutral Tweets

52.22%

52.80%
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When analyzing the correlation of percentage change in tweet sentiment to percent
change in radius of gyration, we found no correlation. The Pearson correlation coefficients for
the relationship between percent change in radius of gyration and percent change in positive
sentiment and percent change in negative sentiment were 0.0925 and 0.0513, respectively. This
leads us to believe there is no significant relationship between the two variables, as is shown in
Figure 3.5. This lack of correlation shows that even if users exhibited a much more negative
sentiment overall during the COVID-19 lockdown period, that this had little to no bearing on
their mobility behavior during that period. This lack of correlation between the two variables
could be due to the drawbacks of using spatiotemporal Twitter data to model individual mobility
behavior, which will be discussed in the next section.

(a)
(b)
Figure 3.5: Correlation of percentage change in tweet sentiment with percentage change in radius
of gyration before and during lockdown procedures: (a) Change in positive tweet sentiment (b)
Change in negative tweet sentiment
Discussion
Through this study we have analyzed the effects lockdown had on individuals’ degree of
movement through spatiotemporal social media data. We also analyzed the effect lockdowns had
on Twitter users’ sentiment and its relationship with mobility behavior. Our results did not
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support that user sentiment was more negative during the lockdown period. However, our results
did support that most individuals had a reduced degree of movement during the lockdown
period. Since 57% of users reduced their movement during lockdown and the median value of
the proportion of radius of gyration before lockdown to during lockdown was approximately
0.9409, our results supported the hypothesis that most users reduced their movement due to
COVID-19 lockdown orders in Florida. Sentiment of users became more positive during
lockdown with positive tweet percentage increasing from 33.51% to 34.35%, and negative tweet
percentage decreasing from 14.26% to 12.86%.
While our sentiment analysis did not support our hypothesis that tweet sentiment would
influence user mobility behavior or that tweet sentiment would be more negative overall during
COVID-19 lockdowns, utilizing tweet sentiment analysis during disaster events is important for
understanding both citizens’ sentiment and attitudes towards a disaster event, and for
understanding the effects of a disaster on a population.
Discrepancies in the analysis could be due to several factors. One of the limitations in
analyzing individual mobility behavior using Twitter is the variance in individual users’ tweeting
habits. Where and when someone prefers to tweet varies from user to user. This makes
spatiotemporal Twitter data different from GPS tracking which can record users’ locations at
regular time intervals. These variabilities in user behavior make spatiotemporal Twitter data
somewhat ineffective in predicting individual mobility behavior due to the high degree of
variability in app usage. However, aggregating the results of social media users by region fails to
consider how individual-level factors can influence users’ mobility. These factors include
individual sentiment and attitudes towards the pandemic, occupation, and local case data and
restrictions. Considering local and individual factors is also important for ensuring citizens’
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human rights are protected. Factors such as local hospitalization and economic data are important
as well. The effect of the pandemic from both physical and psychological standpoints was
exacerbated for healthcare and low-wage workers [43]. These are important factors for
governing bodies in the design of their pandemic restrictions [42, 43].
Another factor that could have influenced our results is regional differences in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Areas with different case numbers and restrictions would affect
residents’ mobility behaviors differently. Evidence shows that individuals in poorer communities
were more negatively affected by the pandemic than individuals living in communities with a
higher socio-economic status. This is because of these communities’ tendency to be more
densely populated and have a deprived standard of living that causes the pandemic to spread
more easily. Vulnerable communities are more commonly found in urban areas as well, causing
these areas of cities to be harder hit by COVID-19 than other areas [44]. These differences could
strongly influence user sentiment about the pandemic in urban areas based on how it has
disproportionately affected them and their communities. This is a possible area for future
research.
Conclusion
This study has provided social media as a viable data source for analyzing individual
mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results show that spatiotemporal data and tweet
text data can be used to model individual mobility and for natural language processing
applications such as user sentiment. The methods in this study can be used to understand and
analyze individuals’ behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a rapidly globalizing world
where people can travel and interact like never before, measures that take advantage of emerging
technology are becoming increasingly vital for controlling the spread of infectious diseases. New
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data sources such as spatiotemporal social media data can help researchers and policy makers to
model mobility during pandemics. Modeling of individual mobility behavior obtained from
analysis of spatiotemporal social media data and sentiment analysis of user tweets can be used to
better design pandemic lockdown protocols and social distancing measures. Using the results of
this analysis, governments and communities around the world can improve their own pandemic
strategies for future pandemic situations.
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CHAPTER FOUR: USING MOBILE PHONE GPS DATA FOR
CONTACT TRACING
Introduction
One of the best tools available in fighting the spread of a pandemic such as COVID-19 is
contact tracing. Contact tracing, a process which according to the CDC includes helping those
diagnosed with COVID-19 safely isolate and notifying people who have come into contact with
someone diagnosed by COVID-19 [45]. Tracing the visited locations and contacts of infected
individuals can help health authorities and other members of a community to identify individuals
who have been exposed to the virus. The COVID-19 pandemic brought about advancements in
the field of contact tracing, including digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing methods that
take advantage of the Bluetooth and GPS capabilities of mobile devices were an important tool
in fighting the spread of COVID-19. Identifying individuals who tested positive for the virus
quickly and quarantining them is vital in preventing the pathogen from spreading uncontrollably.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, digital contact tracing methods saw a huge increase in
implementation around the world. The two principal methods of digital contact tracing used were
Bluetooth contact tracing and GPS contact tracing. These methods of digital contact tracing are
so attractive to health officials because of their ease of use and the lack of cost posed to the user.
As opposed to normal contact tracing methods which require the infected individual to notify
their own contacts or a health authority about their positive test, the digital contact tracing
methods will take care of these responsibilities for the user in general. This study seeks to
analyze the effectiveness of using mobile phone GPS data for contact tracing.
For this study, we assessed the viability of using Google Maps Location History for
contact tracing purposes by evaluating its accuracy in modeling individual mobility. We
conducted analysis on an individual’s GPS data recorded by a QSTARZ BL-1000ST Travel
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Recorder and a smartphone with Google Maps Location History (GMLH) turned on, and
compared the results obtained from each device. We used both devices to create trajectories of an
individual’s movement, as well as an activity diary of their visited locations and stay durations at
each location. We develop a DBSCAN algorithm to generate spatial clusters and determine
visited locations by evaluating distance between coordinate points and minimum stay duration at
each location.
Literature Review
Multiple studies have been able to take advantage of the use of location data to model
individual mobility and generate visited locations and stay durations. One study analyzed Florida
tourist behavior using social media data and generated spatial patterns of tourist movement to
obtain most visited locations within the state [46]. The methodology of this study involved using
multiple clustering algorithms to generate the visited locations of tourists. The algorithms used in
this study to generate spatial clusters were K-means, Mean-Shift, and DBSCAN, all of which are
unsupervised learning methods [46]. Spatial clustering allows us to generate visited locations
with GPS location data based on distance between clusters instead of some predetermined
classification of the data. Other studies have been successful in using Google Maps Location
History to model individual mobility [47, 48].
In studies where visited locations and stay durations are important, such as in air
pollution studies, GMLH data offers researchers a simple and effective method of tracing a large
segment of the population’s spatiotemporal mobility patterns [47]. This is thanks to the wide
availability of smartphone users in the general population. It is estimated that over 85% of adults
in the United States own a smartphone, and over a billion people globally use Google Maps
every month [49]. Also, according to the study conducted by Yu et al., 61% of respondents had
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GMLH data available on their phone [47]. This data confirms that a large percentage of the
population has GMLH and other location recording services enabled on their phone and can
therefore participate in studies or other efforts that require their location history. Location data
collection from smartphones as opposed to a GPS device is also much less susceptible to user
error [51].
The widespread nature of smartphones and applications that record user location have
allowed researchers to analyze human mobility much easier than ever before. However, apps like
Google Maps must be evaluated for their ability to accurately represent individual mobility, as
well as their ability to protect users’ privacy. In the results obtained by Yu et al., by using a GPS
logger as ground truth, they determined Google Maps was able to capture stay duration at each
visited location with errors of 3-5% for 9 of the 10 locations [47]. Another study concluded that
GMLH data was equally representative of mobility as a GPS logger if set to an appropriate
spatiotemporal resolution, and that the coordinate points acquired by GMLH data were
significantly more accurate than call detail record data when compared with the ground truth
GPS logger data [51]. Another study compared GMLH data collected from participants’
smartphones with their travel diaries. Travel diaries were where participants could log their
travel activities over the defined period of the study. It was then found that GMLH data matched
with 51% of visited locations and 32% of trips in the participants’ travel diaries and that GMLH
tended to miss visited locations with shorter stay durations (355 s) [48]. This study determined
that GMLH data is not yet accurate enough to accurately model mobility behavior but still offers
a supplement for recording location history that can be collected passively and reliably [48].
DBSCAN (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise) is an
unsupervised learning algorithm that can reveal patterns in unstructured data. The DBSCAN
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algorithm is density-based which means it determines clusters based on how close together the
data points are [52]. Several studies have employed the DBSCAN algorithm in analysis of GPS
data. The DBSCAN algorithm was used in one study to determine visited locations of tourists in
Florida based on the density of coordinates of social media posts. This study determined that out
of three clustering algorithms for determining visited locations (K-means, DBSCAN, and Meanshift) K-means performed best [46]. Other studies have successfully developed DBSCAN-based
algorithms to analyze spatiotemporal GPS data to a high degree of accuracy as well [54, 55].
Data Description
The data collection step of this study required one of our contributors to carry their
iPhone with Google Maps Location History turned on and a QSTARZ BL-1000ST Travel
Recorder over the course of five days. The GPS device and the participant’s smartphone were
always on their person and were constantly recording their location. The GPS device was set to
record location at one-second intervals while Google Maps recorded location at irregular time
intervals. There are no options to set the resolution for GMLH location data. This data was then
downloaded with the permission of the participant. The QSTARZ GPS device data was
downloaded directly from the device using the QSTARZ software, and the GMLH data was
requested from Google using Google Takeout. Analysis was conducted using Python. There
were some difficulties associated with the collection of location data, such as the tendency for
the GPS device to stop tracking the participant’s location when they walked inside a tall building
with several floors above them. However, the device would quickly resume recording the
participant’s location once they walked outside or could be detected by a satellite once again.
This problem did not appear to affect the GMLH location recording. However, this is still an
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important factor to consider in this study because any inaccuracies that occur indoors with this
method of contact tracing could significantly affect the accuracy of the notification system.
Clustering Methodology
The DBSCAN algorithm used in this study was calculated using the sci-kit learn package
in Python. The DBSCAN algorithm calculates clusters based on how closely packed together the
data points are. The clusters are calculated based on the maximum radius around any given point
to include other points in the same cluster, and the minimum points required in a cluster [52].
These parameters are defined as epsilon and MinPts, respectively. Different parameters will need
to be used for each GPS recording method (GMLH and the QSTARZ Travel Recorder) because
of the difference in resolution between the two recording methods. The QSTARZ Travel
Recorder reads data every second while Google Maps reads location at irregular intervals. The
parameters used for each device are provided in the table below.

Table 4.1: DBSCAN Parameters

QSTARZ Travel Recorder
Google Maps Location
History

Epsilon
10 m
100 m

MinPts
600
4

Therefore, for a group of points to be considered a cluster using the QSTARZ GPS data,
all points need to be within 10 meters of at least one other point within the cluster, and there
needs to be at least 600 points to classify as a cluster. MinPts was determined to be 600 because
we define a stay as a 10-minute-long visit, and since the QSTARZ Travel Recorder records user
coordinates every second, 600 data points at one location is equivalent to 10 minutes spent at that
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location. For a group of points to classify as a cluster in the GMLH dataset, we used a value of
100 meters for Epsilon and a value of 4 for MinPts. These values are so different from the
parameters used for the QSTARZ dataset because the GMLH data was much more sparsely
collected by the participant’s smartphone, so fewer points with a smaller density should be
required to designate a cluster. Different parameters were tested in the DBSCAN algorithm;
however, we found these parameters produced the best representation of the subject’s actual
movement. Once the DBSCAN algorithm has been run for both datasets, we need to remove
“noise” points that do not belong to any clusters. Noise points tended to be points located in
transit between visited locations.
Results
The locations of the clusters calculated using the results of the DBSCAN algorithm were
mapped for each location recording method. The results are provided in the figures below.
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(a)
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(b)

Figure 4.1: Results of DBSCAN Clustering from (a) QSTARZ Travel Recorder Data and (b)
GMLH Data
Clearly the QSTARZ Device provided a much finer resolution with a far greater number
of data points than the GMLH data. This discrepancy also affected the results for number of
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visited locations as well as the accuracy of the activity diary. The data obtained from the
QSTARZ device generated five clusters (or 100% of our subject’s visited locations) when using
the DBSCAN algorithm, while the GMLH data only generated three (60% of our subject’s
visited locations). The QSTARZ device correctly identified 100% of our subject’s visited
locations. These locations are provided in the table below.

Table 4.2: Clustering Results
Cluster No.

Cluster
Location

1
2

Home
University of
Central
Florida
Restaurant
Gym
Airport

3
4
5

QSTARZ Device
Identified
Visited
Location?
Yes
Yes

GMLH
Identified
Visited
Location?
Yes
Yes

Distance
Between
Clusters

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

N/A
86.65 m
N/A

2.88 m
34.54 m

The visited locations the DBSCAN algorithm was able to define with the GMLH data
were very close and nearly identical in location to the corresponding visited locations found
using the QSTARZ GPS data. When used with the sparser GMLH data, this algorithm tended to
generate clusters for the locations our participant visited multiple times. This is likely due to the
increased density of coordinate points around these locations that resulted from our participant
visiting them multiple times. The overall duration spent at these locations is provided in the
figure below.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.2: Visited Location Stay Durations from (a) QSTARZ Travel Recorder Data and (b)
GMLH Data
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The DBSCAN results are provided in depth in the table below for each data source.
While the results from the QSTARZ device were much more accurate to my actual movement,
the GMLH data was able to pick up our participant’s correct number of visits to their gym. This
discrepancy shows that the GMLH data can still be a viable source of spatiotemporal for
modeling individual mobility patterns.
Table 4.3: Stay Duration and Visited Locations Results
Cluster No.

Location

Stay Duration
(QSTARZ
Data)

1
2
3
4
5

Home
UCF
Restaurant
Gym
Airport

64.09 hours
12.33 hours
0.5 hours
1.39 hours
0.87 hours

Times
Visited
(QSTARZ
Data)
5
3
1
1
1

Stay
Duration
(GMLH
Data)
74.51 hours
12.02 hours
N/A
3 hours
N/A

Times
Visited
(GMLH
Data)
5
3
N/A
2
N/A

Discussion
GMLH has many benefits and drawbacks associated with its use in contact tracing
purposes. Its low cost and ease of use make it an appealing source of location data for health
authorities and governments to utilize in tracking the spread of infectious diseases. Since such a
large percentage of the population already owns a smartphone, individuals can easily participate
in a contact tracing program using their GPS location through Google Maps or another app.
Through the analysis in this study, it is clear the while GMLH location data does not record
users’ location at a fine enough resolution for our DBSCAN algorithm to determine the
participant’s correct number of visited locations, GMLH data can still be used to calculate users’
mobility patterns at a reasonably high degree of accuracy.
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There were some limitations associated with this study. One of the main limitations was
associated with the ability for the QSTARZ device to record the participant’s location inside
large buildings. The QSTARZ device had difficulty receiving signal inside of large structures
and would drop signal until the participant left the building. Google Maps on the other hand was
able to continually read the participant’s location. Google Maps’ ability to read the participant’s
location within these buildings makes it an appealing method of data collection for GPS contact
tracing methods since COVID-19 has a much higher chance of being transmitted inside than
outside [57]. One limitation we found through our analysis was the limited access to the
participant’s spatiotemporal data collected through Google Maps. Our QSTARZ GPS device was
able to collect 180,253 coordinate data points while Google Maps was able to only collect 78.
GMLH data appeared to not record data when our participant was in transit between visited
locations. This discrepancy was a source of the discrepancy in our analysis results. While our
GMLH data did collect more data points for the participant’s location throughout the study week,
these points did not have timestamps associated with them within the data provided to us by
Google. Therefore, we could not utilize these data points in analysis of stay duration or visited
locations. Also, timestamps are an important element of an individual’s mobility behavior for
contact tracing purposes because individuals are much more likely to contract the virus when
they are within six feet of an infected individual at the same time [56].
Conclusion
From the results of this study, GMLH data can be used to model individual mobility
behavior with respect to visited locations and stay durations with decent accuracy. There are
issues with using a density-based clustering algorithm like DBSCAN to determine a participant’s
activity diary. However, Google Maps was still able to record coordinate data points at all the
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participant’s visited locations during the study week, even if these points did not generate a
cluster through the DBSCAN algorithm. These points can still be used to determine when and
where an individual was at a location and whether they were able to contract or spread an
infectious disease with another individual. However, the sparse nature of the GMLH data is a
limitation for its use in contact tracing because to measure interactions between individuals,
higher resolution spatiotemporal data is required. However, the accuracy of the spatiotemporal
data points obtained from Google Maps has shown us that with a higher resolution of data points,
a faithful representation of an individual’s mobility could be generated that could be used to
trace the spread of a pandemic.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This study has shown the potential for passively collected social media and GPS data in
the fight against infectious diseases such as COVID-19. Policy makers and health authorities can
take advantage of location data to improve contact tracing and lockdown procedures. Through
this study we discovered many effective uses for this type of data in these pandemic mitigation
measures. First, we evaluated the benefits and drawbacks of GPS and Bluetooth data when used
for digital contact tracing, as well as the different methods of data collection and privacy
protection. Decentralized data collection was more prevalent while centralized data collection
was frowned upon by most of the public. However, centralized methods can be used if the right
steps are taken to protect user privacy. Bluetooth methods were also used more often with
contact tracing applications than GPS methods, but GPS methods were still shown to be viable
options.
While the results of our analysis of mobility using Twitter data did not confirm our
hypotheses, we believe that this is still a viable method for analyzing mobility during the
COVID-19 pandemic and should yield improved results with more data and users. Our analysis
on the use of Google Maps Location History for contact tracing accurately identified locations
and stay durations for locations that were visited multiple times, and the DBSCAN was able to
identify the coordinates of these locations with a high degree of accuracy.
Overall, there were several limitations in this study. Many people are still hesitant to
provide passively collected location data to central authorities such as their government or health
authority. It is important that agencies collecting data remain transparent about their intentions
with this data and make protecting people’s privacy a priority. This way more people will be
willing to share their data to improve pandemic mitigation measures such as contact tracing. A
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limitation associated with the analysis of mobility behavior using Twitter data was the variance
in individual users’ tweeting habits. The tendencies of different Twitter users to tweet at different
times and locations makes it a difficult method for determining individual mobility patterns. The
limitations associated with the study analyzing the use of GMLH data for contact tracing is our
lack of subjects. Since this is sensitive data, we were only able to analyze one of our author’s
data with their permission. For future research it is our hope to improve upon these limitations.
Obtaining more data could improve our analysis and make our results more definitive overall.
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APPENDIX: IRB LETTER OF APPROVAL
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